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1 Introduction 
 
In this thesis I examine posthumanist themes in Kim Stanley Robinson's 
science fiction novel 2312, first published in 2012. I focus on two topics: bodies and 
space. Robinson suggests that humans need to accept the interconnectedness of the 
category of human, and forge a new place for themselves among others.  
 
1.1 The aim and structure of the thesis 
 
The aim of this thesis is to show through analysis and close reading that 
Robinson has constructed a story, in which both transhumanist and posthumanist 
visions of humanity coexist. I will show how the novel constructs the body, and 
through the body, humanity. I will also examine how animal and non-animal others 
foreground questions about the interconnectedness of humans, as embodied beings, 
with other beings and the world.  
To study these themes, I refer to various schools of thought on humanity, the 
body, and the environment. My approach to the study of Robinson's novel is 
interdisciplinary. I have chosen secondary material from the fields of feminist 
studies, science and technology studies, biology, sociology, tourist studies, 
anthropology, human-animal studies, critical disability studies, and geography. 
Despite the wide array of different disciplines, all the secondary material used in this 
thesis approaches humanity and human activity as a construct and a process. 
In this introduction, I provide a brief introduction to the different branches of 
posthumanist thought. In the second chapter, I examine how the boundaries of the 
normal body are policed and enforced, while enhancement simultaneously constructs 
a new kind of human body. Robinson introduces the monstrous body that hides in 
plain sight challenging the limits of the normative body. The proper, normative body 
emerges as one that readily accepts medical intervention, but abhors disorder. My 
theoretical framework for this chapter is based on Margrit Shildrick's work on 
embodiment and monstrosity. For a theoretical background on the commodification 
of the body, I turn to anthropologists Lesley a. Sharp and Linda F. Hogle. I also refer 
to the work of biologists Jessica Hope Whiteside and Dorian Sagan on the topic of 
evolution and symbionts. 
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In chapter three, I aim to show that Robinson challenges the boundaries 
between humans and animals, and humans and artificial lifeforms. In this chapter, I 
examine the madness as animality through John Derby's feminist analysis of 
representations of mental disability. I also refer to Cary Wolfe's work on 
posthumanism and animals. To further study the position of animals in 2312, I turn 
to Mary Murray's article on the history of animals in capitalism, and Donna J. 
Haraway's writing on companion species. For added perspective on the recognition 
of difference, I refer to Donna McCormack's article on queer monsters. 
In chapter four, I examine the production of nature as a bodily practice, and 
the space wild animals allowed within this context. In this chapter, I demonstrate that 
nature is a cultural construct, and thus a dynamic, human relationship, and that the 
use of space shapes humans' abilities to participate in and shape their future. For a 
theoretical approach to examining space and nature production, I refer to 
geographers Nigel Thrift and David Lulka. Katrin A. Lund's article on experiencing 
nature provides further perspective on the sublime aspects of nature experiences. 
 
1.2 Critical Posthumanism and science fiction 
 
Posthumanism is a multidisciplinary field of study that is mainly concerned 
with humanity's relationship with technology, evolution, and other species. The main 
differences between the various approaches within the larger framework of 
posthumanist thought stem from their contrasting relationships with philosophical 
humanism. Here, philosophical humanism refers to the school of thought that centers 
human experience and morality. Pramod K. Nayar delineates two distinct main 
strands of philosophical posthumanist thought: transhumanism and critical 
posthumanism.  
Of these posthumanist disciplines, transhumanism is mainly concerned with 
the transcendent potential of technological progress as it relates to the human body 
and mind. Transhumanism is a direct descendant of humanist philosophy, focused on 
the improvement of the human species. The underlying belief in transhumanist 
thought is that the transcendent phase of human evolution will be reached through 
the use of technology. My use of transcendence here refers to the humanist tradition 
of viewing humans as a species with the potential to overcome the limitations of its 
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material reality through technology. Transhumanist theory posits that biotechnology, 
such as genetic modification, performance-enhancing drugs, prosthetics and other 
implantable technology, will increase the abilities of humans so that a new kind of 
existence and knowledge will emerge.  
The transhumanist body appears as a work in progress, much like a computer 
that can be made more efficient or powerful through improvements on its various 
components. Visions of reaching immortality through technology by having one's 
personality transferred into a computer's memory, or into an android's indestructible 
body, reveal a belief that there is a self, or a soul of sorts (Nayar 6-7). This self is 
believed to be a cohesive entity that can be fully represented as reproducible 
informational patterns.  
Examples of humans represented as information in science fiction can be 
found in the transporters in the various Star Trek series: a living human can be 
broken down into code and reconstructed in a different location. Transporter 
accidents in Star Trek take place in several episodes. In an episode of the Star Trek 
series Voyager, titled "Tuvix", the characters Neelix and Tuvok merge and form a 
new lifeform. The cause of the accident is found to be a symbiogenetic alien plant 
that contains enzymes that caused the genetic codes of Neelix and Tuvok to merge. 
The ship's Doctor uses radioactive matter to label the other person's genes so they 
can be separated by the ship's transporter system and reconstituted. A mere DNA 
pattern is enough to replicate a person. Cyperpunk fiction in the 1980s and 1990s 
also explored the themes of human existence represented as informational patterns, 
subjective existence in cyberspace, and virtual reality. In William Gibson's 
Neuromancer, the protagonist views his body as "so much 'meat' that exists primarily 
to sustain his consciousness until the next time he can enter cyberspace" (Hayles 36). 
Cyberspace and virtual bodies signify the potential to transcend the limitations of the 
physical, mortal body, and live forever as data and energy. 
Eugene Thacker argues that the basis of such transhumanist visions of 
disembodied subjectivities lies in conceptualizing information as "a value 
independent of material instantiation" (85). 
Understood as essentially information, and as (re)programmable, the body … 
increasingly becomes valued less according to any notion of materiality or 
substance (as we still see in modern biology) and more according to the value 
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of information itself as the index to all material instantiation – a kind of 
source code for matter. (Thacker 86) 
Thacker is critical of such a view, arguing that transhumanism's eagerness to 
represent the materiality of the body as an informational pattern is a strategic move 
to avoid engaging with materiality (86-87). This kind of body, Thacker further 
argues, "is purified of undesirable elements (the markers of mortality, disease, 
instability, unpredictability)," but it still " remains a body (a functioning organic-
material substrate)" (93). 
Transhumanism, then, tries to do away with the inconvenient body; the body 
that is uncooperative, ill, disabled, too excessive or too lacking, too gendered or too 
racialized. Critical posthumanism answers this challenge by centering the materiality 
and relationality of existence. Nayar writes:  
Contemporary critiques of traditional humanism … draw upon various 
schools of thought – race studies, poststructuralism, social studies of 
technoscience – to demonstrate how the very notion of the human has been 
exclusionary, and built upon a process whereby the differently abled, women, 
particular races and ethnicities, and animals have been treated as inhuman 
and non-human. Critical posthumanism's philosophical and political purchase 
emerges from recognizing this exclusionary principle behind all humanist 
thought. Critical posthumanism is about greater inclusivity, interconnections, 
co-evolution and mutualities. (35) 
The aim is, then, to deconstruct and question the different traditions of humanism 
that support and recreate structures of oppression and domination. As such, critical 
posthumanism is in a close, if contentious relationship with humanist philosophy. 
What, then, is the relationship between critical posthumanism and science 
fiction? Science fiction offers ways to speculate about the different possible ways of 
being human, and the ways in which humanity may develop. In addition to 
humanity, science fiction incorporates aliens, monsters, androids and a myriad other 
creatures. These others often function as a mirror to humanity, representing the 
things humans are not, or are not allowed to be. Science fiction can thus give 
posthumanist theories eyes, ears, skin, and tentacles. While science fiction writers do 
not necessarily study posthumanist philosophy, a feedback loop between scientific 
discovery, science fiction, and posthumanism exists. New advances in science excite 
the imagination of authors, who create new worlds, and these new worlds provide 
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posthumanist theory with material about imagined possibilities. In other words, 
Science fiction provides a way to speculate about and play with different 
posthumanist visions of humanity and embodiment.  
 
1.3 Synopsis of Kim Stanley Robinson's 2312 
 
In 2312, humans have spread out into the solar system, establishing colonies, 
cities, science stations, and mining operations on nearly every planet in the solar 
system. Larger asteroids have been hollowed out, and turned into zoos that hold and 
breed animals that are extinct, or nearly extinct on Earth. Asteroids also function as 
mass transit vehicles, moving people and cargo along their orbit. Many of the human 
habitats in space are part of the Mondragon Accord, a cooperative economic system 
that utilizes artificial intelligence to calculate the material needs of each community. 
Earth, however, is still under a capitalist economic system, and inequality is rife. 
Mercury, the nearest planet to the sun, hosts Terminator, a city that travels on 
a circular track, traveling ahead of the dawn. The novel's main protagonist Swan Er 
Hong lives in this bubble-like city. Swan Er Hong and has a long professional 
history as a terrarium designer but in her later years, she has focused on creating 
artworks that combine body art and environmental art. She is 137 years old, but not 
geriatric: she has received longevity treatments since before her birth as is the 
custom for space-dwelling humans. As a character, she is mercurial and at times 
unpredictable in her actions. Her actions throughout the novel are however driven by 
recognizable motives: at first by grief, and later by a desire to affect change, and 
continue the good work of others before her. 
The novel's main plot is set in motion as Swan discovers a data chip among 
her deceased step-grandmother Alex's belongings. A recorded message asks her to 
deliver the item to a man named Wang on Jupiter's moon Io. With the help of Alex's 
surviving partner, Mqaret, Swan discovers about a group that is continuing Alex's 
work. Alex had been mapping out the power structures among human communities, 
and the potential for shifting power away from Earth governments into space in 
order to stabilize the entire network of powers. Before her death, she had been 
setting up a secret network capable of enacting her plan. Alex's discovery of the 
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potential misuse of quantum computer infrastructure had however caused difficulties 
in finding secure modes of communication. 
While still on Mercury, Swan meets Fitz Wahram, the novel's second main 
character. Wahram is a citizen of Saturn's moon Titan, and a diplomat involved with 
Swan's grandmother's secret group. Together, Swan and Wahram set off toward Io. 
After meeting with Wang, Swan travels to Earth to meet with her former partner, 
Zasha, on the East Coast of the United States. While there, she narrowly escapes 
being kidnapped by locals, and rewards the young man who helps her, Kiran, by 
arranging for him to travel to Venus. On Venus, Kiran begins working as a double 
agent, gathering information about two factions vying for power.  
After Swan and Wahram return to Mercury, they narrowly escape the 
complete destruction of Terminator. A massive projectile destroys the city's tracks 
and leaves Terminator at a standstill, as the planet rotates toward dawn. The 
inhabitants of the city evacuate. As the city burns in the sunlight, Swan and Wahram 
escape into a utility tunnel that runs under the planet's surface along the tracks. 
Before reaching the tunnel, they are both exposed to dangerous levels of solar 
radiation, caused by a massive flare in the sun's corona. In the tunnel, they meet a 
group of Mercury's sunwalkers – people who endlessly walk the planet's surface 
ahead of the dawn. Together the survivors walk the tunnel for days, while Swan 
slowly succumbs to radiation poisoning. Eventually they are saved, and recover. 
Swan is revealed to have survived the deadly dose of radiation because of a body 
modification she had performed decades ago.  
Swan and Wahram meet up with Jean Genette, an inspector in an 
interplanetary intelligence agency. Genette is investigating the destruction of 
Terminator. As the investigation progresses, it becomes apparent that the destruction 
of Terminator was a deliberate attack, set in motion years ago by unknown entities. 
Another attack is discovered to be in progress. During the investigation of the attack 
on Terminator, it is revealed that the Venusians have been using humanoid quantum 
computer-based agents to carry out their terror plots. The humanoid androids are 
deemed a threat to all of humanity and sentenced to exile along with their creators. A 
few androids however escape detection, and remain free. Swan and Zasha help one 
android to escape to begin a new life in New York among humans. 
Besides trying to thwart and investigate the terror plot, Swan and Wahram 
continue Alex's work on repopulating the Earth with animals. The terraria have been 
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used as a way to stockpile animals for the reanimation effort. The work is conducted 
in secret, without the input or consent of Earth governments or its inhabitants. At 
first, Earth-dwelling humans are shocked and even traumatized by the appearance of 
innumerable animals around the world, but as time passes, humans adjust to the new 
order of things. As decades pass, the reanimation comes to be seen as a pivotal event 
in what is implied to be a transformative change in the power relations of the entire 
human diaspora.  
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2 Human Bodies 
 
In this chapter, I study how Robinson depicts the human body. I argue that 
two different constructions of the body emerge in the novel: normal or normative, 
and posthuman. The normal, or normative human body, is a body with enforced 
boundaries. It is a body that is compatible with a transcendent view of humans as a 
species. The second kind of human body is a less bounded body that is open to 
connections and unpredictable change. Throughout the novel, Robinson shows how 
the boundaries of the normal body are policed and enforced, while enhancement and 
modification simultaneously constructs a new kind of hybrid, open human body. 
The first part of this chapter discusses the normative body and its 
commodification through the medicalization of its parts and functions. I examine the 
ideological and philosophical implications of such a construction of the human body 
in the novel, and the ways in which the characters of Kiran, Wahram, and Swan 
challenge it. The second part of this chapter discusses Swan's body as a monstrous 
body. I apply Margrit Shildrick's discussion of the monstrous other to the character 
of Swan Er Hong, and the ways the character's modification of her own body acts as 
resistance against the ideology of human exceptionalism.   
 
2.1 The normative human body 
 
For the space-dwelling humans, or spacers, advanced medical biotechnology 
is an essential part of being human. Their bodies are enhanced and repaired 
continuously through invasive and non-invasive treatments designed to increase 
wellbeing and longevity. Enhancements begin in utero for those, whose parents 
choose to endow their children with both male and female reproductive capabilities. 
Taking supplemental hormones like oxytocin and vasopressin to increase feelings of 
wellbeing and happiness is commonplace. 
However, access to these treatments is restricted: only the relatively small 
community of spacers who live in the co-operative, post-scarcity communities 
covered by the Mondragon Accord have extensive bodily enhancements. The spacers 
in these communities have evolved into new kinds of humans: smalls, who are 
especially suited to living on high-gravity planets, and talls, who thrive in low 
gravity environments. All spacers appear different to Earth humans. For example, 
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Swan Er Hong, who is neither a tall nor a small, is described by an Earth human as 
"old, tall, good looking" and moving "as if she were swimming" (111).1 
Earth's 11 billion inhabitants are, for the most part, excluded from advanced 
medical technologies. Compared to spacers, Earth humans appear primitive to Swan 
in their reproductive habits: "Two faces: mother and daughter. Here it was such a 
clear thing; it looked like parthenogenesis" (104). Earth humans are also described as 
"thin and small, bent and dark," ravaged by manual labor and hardship (307). 
Regardless of their differences, spacers and Earth-dwellers are on the same human 
continuum, each body holding the potential for enhancement. The character of Kiran 
exemplifies this potential. Kiran saves Swan from being kidnapped by his own 
family, and Swan offers to send him to space. He accepts the offer and is smuggled 
to Venus, where he begins a new life as a worker and a double agent. After proving 
himself to the ruling elites on Venus, he gains access to a new prosthetic technology: 
translating glasses that reveal all the information in his environment he was 
previously unable to understand. 
[W]hen he looked at Chinese language signs, with all their intricate 
ideograms, he now saw them overlaid in glowing red with the words 
rendered in English. It was startling to discover just how much information 
was written into the cityscape, now in glowing red: Beware of the Three 
Withouts. Vote for stormy Chang. Towering Mountain Beer. The Door in the 
Middle of Half the Sky Alterations. (281) 
The glasses also translate speech: "Red writing plastered over the visible world – it 
could be disconcerting, but it was so nice to have things explained at last" (284). The 
glasses enable Kiran to learn the language faster, and more importantly, they make 
him a better spy as he can use them to record translated conversations. While this 
enhancement enables Kiran to learn faster and make use of the information 
embedded in his environment, the translator apparatus also reveals the limitations of 
the human capability to process new information. 
Enhancements of the body can be framed as prostheses that supplement the 
existing functions of the body. Prostheses are both material artefacts such as cochlear 
implants, and discursive frameworks (Shildrick, "Prostheses" 271). In my thesis, I 
use the term prostheses to refer both to physical prosthetic devices, and the larger set 
                                                
1 References to 2312 are given by page numbers in brackets. 
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of biomedical technologies and other aids used by humans in the novel. Such 
technologies include devices such as glasses that translate speech in real time, body 
braces that aid travelers in unusual gravities, and medical technologies used to 
increase longevity. Margrit Shildrick argues that the supplementary event, that is, the 
use of prosthetic technology that specifically adds new functions or abilities to the 
body "is always a paradox in that it implies a movement to both augment – even 
make whole – an existing object, and at the same time to substitute or replace that 
object" ("Prostheses" 278). The enhanced body, then, by its very ability to 
incorporate prosthetic technologies, marks the unenhanced body as an incomplete 
body by revealing the body's "originary lack" ("Prostheses" 277). The multitude of 
longevity-increasing therapies, and other treatments the spacers engage in, reveal a 
vision of the unenhanced human body as one that is not realizing its whole human 
potential, and is therefore lacking. A fully realized human in 2312 is, then, one who 
strives to reach his or her full potential and to take advantage of prosthetic 
technologies. 
Prosthetics can also be framed as technologies that replace, or repair, the 
functionalities of a normal body. Therapeutic prosthetic technologies aim to alleviate 
suffering and to decrease the effects of disability. This, in turn, plays a part in 
drawing the boundaries of a healthy and normative body that needs no medical 
intervention. The healthy body is a body that lacks a pathological source of suffering 
or degeneration. In other words, a healthy body can only be and is only defined 
through its relationship with illness, disease, and disability. Shildrick argues that the 
healthy body is marked by its absence, that is, the body is not experienced as a 
presence until it becomes "diseased, damaged or otherwise unwhole". The 
experience of illness and disability is when, Shildrick writes, "the body forces itself 
into our consciousness and that comfortable absence is lost" (Monster 77). The body, 
then, becomes an uncomfortable reality, reminding the subject of its physicality. 
The process of the body becoming visible and ailing through suffering, and 
the process of healing play out in the novel when Wahram goes through the removal 
and regeneration of a limb. As Swan and Wahram are on their way to Venus on the 
ship ETH Mobile, a second interplanetary terror attack is discovered to be in process, 
targeting Venus's sunshield. The ship they are traveling on is evacuated, and directed 
toward the gathering mass of projectiles to prevent the attack from causing damage 
to the planet. Swan and Wahram exit the ship in personal space suits, and quickly 
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become stranded in space. A rescue shuttle approaches, but a piece of shrapnel from 
the destroyed ETH Mobile causes an explosion, thus demolishing the smaller ship. 
Wahram's suit is damaged by a piece of shrapnel, causing an injury to his leg. Swan 
tends to his wounds, and he survives the ordeal. His leg, however, is amputated 
below the knee: 
In the three weeks it took to reach Pluto and Charon, Wahram's injured leg 
took a turn for the worse, and after a consultation among themselves, the 
ship's medical team decided to amputate it just below the knee and begin the 
pluripotent stem cell work that would start the growth of a new left leg. 
Wahram endured this with as little attention as possible, quelling the dread in 
him and reminding himself that at 113 his whole body was a medical artifact, 
and regrowing lost limbs was one of the simplest and oldest of body 
interventions. Nevertheless it was creepy to look at, and phantom itchy to 
feel … no matter how much he distracted himself, he never got used to the 
sensation of the new leg growing down from his knee. (524) 
Not only is Wahram cleaved into an observing, immaterial subject and a material, 
experiencing body, but his body is further separated, or split via medical 
intervention, into "his body" and "the leg".2 Shildrick argues that medical 
interventions, including surgeries, require a splitting of the subject from the body: 
The body is reduced to the status of personal property, inalienable in 
principle, but to be disposed of as the rational agent sees fit. It may be 
modified at will: cut up, supplemented by prostheses, or have its parts 
replaced by organic material from other bodies. ("Heart" 234) 
The separation of body and mind is, then, utilized whenever it is necessary to do so 
to facilitate treatment: Wahram is able to withstand the deeply unsettling sensations 
of growing a new leg by considering it an external object. Wahram's new leg is 
distanced from the rest of Wahram's body as a result of the physical discomfort and 
his outright abhorrence of the process of growing a new leg. The growing leg is "a 
leg, "it", "the new leg" instead of simply his leg.  
Wahram's dread reveals the complex psychological effects of the 
fragmentation of the body as it is subjected to medical procedures that challenge the 
experience of it as a whole. Medical treatment demands a construction of the body as 
                                                
2 By subject, I mean the immaterial, permanent, rational subject of the humanist tradition. 
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an object separate from the mind: if the body is considered inseparable from the 
mind, each medical intervention would then affect the mind as well, making medical 
treatments such as organ transplantations a highly fraught issue. Such a split between 
the mind and the body is thus enforced both by the medical community and the 
patient so that the healthy, normal body can once again be restored. The absent, 
healthy body may however remain unattainable. For example, even after "the leg" 
has been restored, Wahram continues to experience his body as altered: "I keep 
placing [the leg] and finding it's not quite where I thought it was. Apparently the 
ghost nerves of the old leg are still speaking to me and messing me up" (548). Here, 
the original body still retains its formerly experienced physical boundaries. The 
amputated leg still exists as a physical memory, and the new leg is still felt as an 
addition. The split between the body and the mind is however less pronounced as the 
need for enforcing it lessens and experience of alterity decreases. 
In addition to making invasive medical treatments more acceptable, the 
division of the patient into a mechanical, repairable body, and a separate, immaterial 
subject further enables a commodification of body parts and their functions.  By 
commodification, I mean the processes through which bodies and their parts become 
tradeable goods. Examples of such commodification in the novel are the 
fragmentation of bodies into the smallest possible manipulable units and the 
harvesting of body tissue. Lesley A. Sharp frames the commodification of bodies as 
two parallel and potentially simultaneous processes: the same transplantable organ 
may represent the loss and essence of a loved one to a layperson as well as be an 
object or professional and economic desire for a surgeon (292). In 2312, Swan's 
body fragments become a desired commodity to Mqaret, a synthetic biologist, after 
Swan survives having been exposed to usually fatal levels of radiation.  
In her past, Swan has ingested a bacterial lifeform found living in the deep 
seas of Saturn's moon Enceladus in an attempt to induce synesthesia. Swan's step-
grandparent Mqaret views this modification as a reckless, potentially life-threatening 
act. However, after it becomes apparent that the bacterial lifeform has protected her 
from radiation poisoning during the attack on Terminator, Mqaret becomes 
interested in its medical uses. Samples of Swan's blood are taken, and she becomes a 
living prototype of a potential new human enhancement technology. Her blood 
samples become a source of information about the potential of the human body to 
transcend yet another formerly unsurmountable boundary. Resilience and 
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regeneration, then, is considered a desirable feature in human bodies, while 
synesthesia is not. Linda F. Hogle argues that the enhancement of certain human 
features reinforces and intensifies the status of these features: "[The enhancement] 
forms a circuit of enterprise, biology, medicine, and culture in complex relations to 
each other. In this sense, the traits being enhanced are not inherently natural but 
cultural" (703). The varied spacer bodies such as the smalls and talls, then, are not an 
expression of the physical transformative potential of human bodies, but rather an 
expression of cultural norms, desires, and impulses. 
Hence, Robinson's spacer community's normative body is a commodified, 
fragmented body that can be modified extensively to achieve desirable outcomes. 
This body is enhanced through medical procedures and prosthetic technologies so 
that the subject inhabiting the body can transcend its original limitations: the spacers 
live longer, have a wide variety of reproductive options, and have access to cognitive 
aids that allow them to outperform their unaltered human peers. This view of the 
body is aligned with the humanist tradition that sees the subject as the rational owner 
of the mechanical body. Still, Kiran, Wahram and Swan disturb this neat division by 
revealing complex relationships to their altered bodies and prosthetic technologies. 
In the next section, I will further discuss how Robinson explores monstrous 
embodiment and the boundaries of the human body through Swan. 
 
2.2 Swan and the monstrous body 
 
In this section I examine the character of Swan Er Hong, and the ways the 
character's modification of her own body acts as resistance against the ideology of 
human exceptionalism. I argue that Swan, by modifying her body for 
experimentation's sake, resists the human body norms of the spacer community. At 
the same time, her body, through its nonhuman components, engages with the 
monstrous and challenges the definitions of what can be considered human. Unlike 
the larger spacer community that is mainly focused on longevity, Swan seeks out 
biotechnological modifications that do not have any defined health-promoting 
outcomes. I will discuss Swan's microbial body modification: a bacterial lifeform 
discovered in the polar oceans of Saturn's moon Enceladus.  
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Swan's motivation for ingesting the bacterial lifeform is its potential to 
induce enhanced experiences of synesthesia. Her choice to modify her body in such 
a way is not based on improving the health, appearance, or longevity of the body. 
She is instead seeking an altered sense of perception and information processing that 
is generally considered anomalous in humans. As Swan is en route to Earth on a 
blackliner, a terrarium that functions like a sensory deprivation tank, the 
overwhelming darkness leads her to experience visual hallucinations. This brings 
back memories of the ingestion of the Enceladan lifeforms:  
Pauline, newly inside her, warning her not to do it; the little chalice full of 
Enceladusea irwinii and other Enceladan microscopic lifeforms; the votary 
giving it to her and saying, "Do you understand?" and Swan replying that she 
did, the biggest lie of her life; the taste of the infusion, like blood; the heave 
in her stomach; the way after a moment of blackout the candlelight returned 
and grew too bright to look at; the waves-on-the-beach roar all through her, 
everything becoming brilliantly stuffed with color, Saturn looking like a 
confection of mint and cantaloupe. (82) 
Swan experiences a period of intense synesthesia, and then realizes she is forever 
changed by the new lifeform now inside her: "Crying out then as if poisoned, 
trapped in a kaleidoscope, a roaring in her ears, exclaiming over and over, But I was 
– I was Swan – I was – I was Swan – " (82-83, italics original). Her choice to modify 
her body in such a way is marked by regret and horror at its irreversibility. Once the 
bacterial lifeforms have integrated into the microbiota of her body, they cannot be 
excised without harm to the whole system. The Enceladan lifeform causes an 
immediate physical reaction in Swan as the lifeform integrates to the existing 
complex community of life in her gut. Her immune system does not excise the new 
lifeform: decades later Swan's life is saved by its potential to rid her body of 
accumulated toxins. The lifeform is thus a symbiont that is able to integrate to the 
host body's microbiota. 
The method of the Enceladan bacteria's introduction to the body is 
reminiscent of how the current human microbiota is thought to have emerged. 
Jessica Hope Whiteside and Dorian Sagan write: 
The biologist Margaret McFall-Ngai emphasizes the huge concentrations of 
microbes in the waters in which our ancestors evolved. Some of these 
bacteria are symbionts required by the normal digestion processes of the 
 15 
animals in whose guts they live. McFall-Ngai points out that immune 
systems may have originated from the systematic recognition of intestinal 
symbionts in the aqueous medium. (217) 
Symbionts, Whiteside and Sagan argue, are, and have always been, a key component 
of evolution. One of the oldest symbiont is the mitochondria: "It is accepted in 
textbooks that they were once bacteria — bacteria that became symbiotic, merging 
strains, to form a new, more powerful living whole" (211). Whiteside and Sagan 
further argue that the spirochete, another bacterial lifeform, may be an even older 
symbiotic partner, one so old it is barely recognizable as other than human: "Like the 
Cheshire Cat fading to a smile, our oldest bacterial ancestors blended so well, 
perhaps, that of their original individual presence only the slightest signs of them 
remain" (ibid.). Humans and other animals have always merged with others, and 
Swan's act can be compared to that of taking daily doses of Lactobacillus to aid 
digestion. Indeed, the ingestion of unknown substances is not what horrifies society 
and Swan herself, rather, the horror stems from the alien lifeform's potential for 
contagion, invasion and monstrosity. 
Monstrosity, Margrit Shildrick argues, is often based on the hybrid and 
unnatural form of the body (Monster 10). Monsters, Shildrick writes, are disturbing 
because they remind us of nature's ability to produce endless variation in bodies. 
Nature, paradoxically, in producing monsters, produces the unnatural:  
Organic bodies are as it were naturalised post hoc, where the epithet 
‘unnatural’ implies a location that is literally out of place, the scene of 
cultural degradation or the abnormal, although that might sometimes signify 
the marvellous. The reverse terminology is even less straightforward, for 
although nature may be accorded positive value as the site of the pure and 
uncontaminated, it also threatens to overspill the boundaries of the proper. 
When set against culture as that which is managed and regulated, nature is at 
best base and unruly – that which must be controlled – and at worst that 
which is deeply disruptive and uncontrollable. (Shildrick, Monster 11) 
The very existence of the monstrous body thus marks it as natural, while it is also 
marked as unnatural by its form. This confusion makes visible the unstable ideas of 
nature: nature as both governed by natural law and thus predictable and pure, and 
nature as the source of endless mutation. Likewise, culture is also simultaneously 
constructed as corrupting and enforcing order. Monsters and the monstrous, argues 
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Shildrick, thus do more than "threaten to overrun the boundaries of the proper": they 
in fact "promise to dissolve them" (ibid.). 
Swan's body does not appear outwardly monstrous, yet she is keenly aware 
of her difference. After the destruction of Terminator Swan and Wahram walk 
Mercury's underground utility tunnels to reach safety. As the days go by, Swan's 
health deteriorates, until Wahram finds Swan unconscious. She has fainted while 
relieving herself, and Wahram cleans her up. When Swan comes to, she tells him she 
is a carrier of the Enceladan bacteria. "I did that. A long time ago. So, well, some 
people don't like the idea. Don't even like to be in contact with a person who's done 
it" (167).  Swan is aware that the composition of her body arouses fear and disgust in 
others.  
Tending to the vulnerable Swan renders Wahram vulnerable to the monstrous 
otherness within Swan. The moment of contagion takes place during what is often 
seen as woman's work: the cleaning and dressing of the body of another human who 
is dependent on the helper. That the contagious body is the leaking body of Swan, 
who uses female pronouns and whose primary sex is female, is also significant. 
Shildrick argues that female bodies hold a special place in the monstrous 
imagination:  
In the western imagination, the female body just is monstrous, the necessary 
locus of worship and disgust whose corporeality threatens to overflow 
boundaries and engulf those things which should remain separate. As Liz 
Grosz notes, it is ‘inscribed as a mode of seepage’ characterised as ‘a leaking, 
uncontrollable, seeping liquid: as formless flow; as viscosity, entrapping, 
secreting; as lacking not so much or simply the phallus but self-
containment...a formlessness that engulfs all form, a disorder that threatens 
all order’ (1994: 203). The transhistorical hostility towards the feminine 
expresses, then, a fear of, and revulsion from, bodies that appear unable to 
maintain the distinction and definition required by the sovereign self. 
(Monster 75) 
Leaky female bodies, according to Shildrick, serve as a monstrous other to that of 
the contained, bounded male body (Monster 32). This division of the bounded male 
and the leaky female is reflected in Swan and Wahram in multiple ways. 
Vulnerability, Shildrick writes, "is feared as a condition of both mind and 
body, an ontological as well as physical state, an embodied being in which those 
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familiar mind/body distinctions enacted by postEnlightenment thought are 
suspended" (Monster 72, formatting original). The denial of vulnerability involves a 
moral judgement: bodies that are infected, ailing, and compromised are often seen as 
signs of "an inner deficiency of will, or prior moral dereliction". Wahram, in 
response to Swan's revelation, instinctively reverts to judging Swan for infecting 
herself decades ago.  
Without intending to, he said, "You've done some strange things to yourself."  
She made a face and looked away. "Moral condemnation of other people is 
always rather rude, don't you think?" 
"Yes, I do. Of course." (167) 
Wahram is, however, potentially a host to the same alien lifeform himself after 
caring for Swan. Wahram's reaction is fear: "Wahram gulped uneasily, felt a jolt of 
queasiness. Was that the alien bug, or just the thought of the bug? No way to tell. 
What was done was done, he could not change it" (167). Wahram's fear of contagion 
reveals the vulnerability and openness of the normative body. This reality is pushed 
aside by Wahram so that he may regain the illusion of bodily integrity and moral 
superiority. The leakiness and monstrosity of Swan's body, then, threatens the 
normative (male) body and its boundaries through contagion. The normative, 
contained male body is shown to be as vulnerable and leaky as that of the female 
body: touching the other and thus connecting with the other creates a relationship in 
which biological matter and meaning is exchanged, and irreversible changes may 
occur. That the strangeness and monstrousness in Swan's body is so easily 
transferred to Wahram shows that monstrosity is already an existing potential within 
us. 
Monstrosity marks the potential for otherness inherent in leaky, 
uncontrollable bodies, and reveals an originary excess. All bodies are, in other 
words, already leaky, open, unwhole and dependent on others. The body is not a 
static, closed off container for its organs and the mind, but an open system, 
constantly taking in and expelling matter, and regulating itself in response to its 
environment. The body, always a multispecies assemblage, readily accepts new 
symbionts, and is open to the potential for rapid, even monstrous evolutionary 
change. Robinson thus shows that the medicalized, normative body is a framework 
of control that seeks to contain that which is classified as human, and to exclude that 
which is not. Robinson shows the fragility of this body, and the fragility of the 
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transhumanist view of humans as exceptional beings. Swan's monstrous body shows 
that evolution takes nonlinear turns and has no plan. Humans may guide this process 
through biotechnology, but full control of any body, with its billions of cohabitants, 
is always illusory.  
In creating a biotechnological implant that medicine cannot excise from the 
body, Robinson also shows the unwieldiness of the body as an open system. Even 
with all the medical imaging technologies available, and the ability to break matter 
down to its smallest components, the human body and its microbiota remains an 
unconquered world. Here, the body truly is a multispecies assemblage, constituted in 
its becoming. Microevolution through the Enceladan bacteria is also contrasted with 
evolution through medicine – both are entangled through Swan's body. Robinson 
however makes no final moral judgement about either kind of development of the 
human species. Medicine and its enhancements provide a way to overcome suffering 
and a way to extend life, while spontaneous mutations reintroduce chaos into the 
linear progress of evolution. 
 
2.3 Concluding remarks 
 
In 2312, Robinson presents a society with two competing models of 
humanity. The normative human is a remnant of the old world that centers the 
human as the exceptional pinnacle of evolution. This is the body that is continually 
enhanced and improved upon through biotechnology in the hopes that one day it will 
become invincible. The boundaries of this normative body are however cultural, not 
physical: they must be enforced through cultural processes. Disability and 
vulnerability must be either cured or excluded as other for this body to maintain its 
shape. This medicalized body is challenged by the leaky, open, monstrous body of 
Swan, who takes risks with symbionts and contagion. She modifies her body for 
artistic purposes and pleasure, and makes visible the potential other, always 
present in the human body.  
Through these bodies, Robinson shows the ability of the human body to 
adapt. The body adapts to new body parts, new symbionts, and prosthetic devices, 
integrating them into the whole fully or partially. The boundaries of the body shift 
continuously through its lifetime as it interfaces with technologies, environments, 
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and other equally leaky beings. What emerges is a body that is never fully human. 
We are, as Whiteside and Sagan argue, always a multispecies chimera to begin with, 
and we add to the community of it with every interaction. The normative, 
exceptional human body is, as a result, shown to be a fiction, and a part of an 
evolutionary, often nonlinear continuum. 
In the next chapter, I examine the relationships between humans, nonhuman 
animals, and non-animal lifeforms. These relationships reveal further instabilities on 
the boundaries between the human and those that are perceived as others.  
 20 
3 Non-human Bodies 
 
In this chapter, I discuss nonhuman bodies in the novel. I argue, that by 
introducing nonhuman characteristics (implants of animal and technological origin) 
in the character of Swan, and recognizable sameness (embodiment, consciousness 
and language) in the nonhuman android, Robinson shows the arbitrariness of the 
boundaries of the human. Furthermore, I argue that Pauline, Swan's quantum 
computer implant, represents a lifeform that is incompatible with humanist 
hierarchies of exclusion: Pauline, as a symbiotic lifeform, and one with an 
ambiguous relationship to bodily suffering, does not fit the human-centric 
framework of how non-human beings are granted rights. Through these characters, 
Robinson explores the arbitrariness of human exceptionalism, and shows points of 
connection between humans and nonhumans. 
In the first part of the chapter, I examine the human-animal taxonomy. 
Swan's relationship with hunting and animals explores the commodified nature of 
human-animal relationships, and reveals different ways of relating to the other, 
including othered humans. In the second part of the chapter, I discuss the emergence 
of non-animal life and the implications of its emergence. Examining these 
encounters and emergences is important, because through the characters of the 
android and the computer person, Robinson reveals humanist preconceptions about 
the nature of consciousness, and foregrounds questions of exclusion. For example, 
the differences between the humanoid android and Pauline show how characteristics 
perceived as human affect their societal position as living beings.  
 
3.1 Animal life 
 
In 2312, the large mammal populations of Earth have been decimated by 
catastrophic climate change. Most species are conserved and bred in hollowed-out 
asteroid terraria that represent all the different biotopes Earth had before the 
catastrophe. In addition to historical biotopes, new hybrid biotopes (Ascensions) 
contain combinations of species and plant life that would have not appeared on Earth 
without human intervention.  
Each terrarium functions as an island park for the animals inside it. 
Ascensions cause hybridization and ultimately new species. The more 
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traditional biomes conserve species that one Earth are radically endangered 
or extinct in the wild. Some terraria even look like zoos; more are purely 
wilderness refugia; and most mix parkland and human spaces in patterned 
habitat corridors that maximize the life of the biome as a whole. (40) 
On the asteroids, people can pass through animal habitats, and occasionally interact 
with them. While the animals in the terraria appear to have a natural fear of humans, 
humans are not an intimate part of their world: humans are neither prey, kin, nor 
their predators.  
Travelers on their way to other places and other terraria can take guided tours 
in the wilderness parks to see animals, and zoologists wander the grounds tending to 
the animals. While on route to Io, Swan and Wahram travel on the asteroid Wegener, 
a terrarium modeled after a savannah. Wahram joins a group trying to do a census of 
the zoo's wildlife, and they come across signs of someone hunting in the park. The 
hunter is Swan. This hunting behavior is normal for Swan while she travels: she 
prefers the openness of the park to the confined spaces of buildings, and feels 
connected to the animals. The scene where Swan's hunting is discovered is focalized 
through Wahram: 
Then one morning they came on Swan still crouched by her little fire, her 
face greasy and streaks of blood still on her hands, with a small mass of fur 
there between her feet. She looked up at them with a feral glare, very like the 
look one would have gotten from a hyena caught in the same moment, and 
for a long time no one knew quite what to say. Poaching was no more 
popular with the authorities that it had ever been, Wahram saw with a quick 
glance at the zoologist, although Swan would not be hung for it; and indeed, 
because of her founder status here, the locals, all half her age at most, were 
shuffling around, trying to find a way out of the situation. (54) 
Swan's emotions or thoughts are not revealed, and her mind remains, to the 
onlookers, as unknowable as that of any other animal. For a moment, Swan becomes 
profoundly other to the travelers, and, to an extent, the reader. This unknowability 
and strangeness briefly destabilizes the boundaries between non-human and human, 
and uncomfortably reminds the onlookers of the potential consciousness of the 
animal looking back at them.  
Animal-like behaviors in humans are also linked with representations and 
constructs of madness. Swan is recognized as an authority figure and an elder by the 
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locals. This, combined with her behavior, suggests the possibility that the locals see 
Swan as having a mental breakdown. Madness, John Derby writes, was positioned as 
"an evolutionary regression" in the 19th century by using photographic 
representations of the mentally ill (26). Insanity thus became correlated "with sub-
human animal behavior", with human males seen "as the most pure and natural life 
form," followed by "animals ranked progressively lower according to biological 
deformity, with ‘monsters' at the very bottom" (ibid.).  
The imagery that links human madness with animals is in part used to define 
the boundaries between the human and the animal. Normative human bodies in 
2312, as discussed in chapter two, are complex but manageable biomechanical 
wholes that are, from a medical standpoint, like the bodies of other animals. The 
differences that separate humans from other animals therefore must reside in the 
mind and its faculties, namely, human rationality. A person's humanity, according to 
this view, is measured by how fully they embody the ideals of sanity, reason and 
civility (Derby 21). This in turn suggests, Derby writes, "that mentally disabled 
people are irrational", and thus they are positioned as less human (ibid.). Derby 
further argues that according to Foucault, the human morality based on the virtues 
mentioned above "constitute a façade of privilege that humans who hold power 
strive to maintain" (ibid.). Upholding these values as central to humanity in turn 
reveals, according to Derby's reading of Foucault, that "we fear animals, madness, 
and other ‘primitive' things because we recognize them in ourselves. To this end, 
madness must be vigilantly controlled, like our controlling of domesticated and wild 
animals" (ibid.).  
The linking of animality to disorder and irrationality is the result of viewing 
order and rationality as the ultimate human virtues. Animals, according to the 
definition of humanity based on the qualities of the mind, lack the privileged virtues 
of sanity, civility and reason. As a result, the rights they are granted are not based on 
the inherent qualities of the animal, but rather based on their perceived proximity to 
these human virtues. Cary Wolfe argues that this system of values, or speciesism, 
and its underlying system of morality is what allows for "the ethical acceptability of 
the systematic ‘noncriminal putting to death' of animals based solely on their 
species" (Animal 8). Wolfe further argues that speciesism is also what "makes 
possible a symbolic economy in which we can engage in … a ‘noncriminal putting 
to death' of other humans by marking them as animal" (Animal 6).  
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Swan's hunting behavior reveals the hierarchical structures that are used to 
enforce the boundaries between the human and the animal as based on the humanist 
traditions, and strategies, of exclusion. In appearing mad, her actions are judged to 
be the result of madness: irrational, somewhat unintentional, and thus not based on 
human morality. Swan, marked by her behavior as both subhuman and animal, 
represents a complex moral problem for the locals. Her capital crime is ignored, 
because she is both other (animal, mad), and human (peer, elder), and thus her crime 
cannot be attributed to a knowing violation of human law and morality. In other 
words, she cannot be punished and sentenced to death because to commit and be 
deemed guilty of a crime, one must be human, and capable of human virtue. Animals 
and the insane, according to the humanist hierarchies of exclusion, are not to be 
punished for their lack of reason and morals, but instead physically excluded for 
human society, or confined to spaces where they cannot harm humans or other 
beings deemed worthy of protection.  
Human virtue does not feature in Swan's view of animals. Animals, 
according to Swan, are an integral link in the chain of food production, creating soil 
through their activity and "sheer biomass" (417). Swan tries to convince a group of 
pub patrons on Earth that the animals, suddenly appearing everywhere because of the 
rewilding effort, are essential to Earth and humanity. She decries speciesism and its 
effects on humans: "They're our horizontal brothers and sisters, enslaved as living 
meat, and when that can happen to them it can happen to you too, and it has. You 
people are meat!" (416). Here, the implication is that animal and human bodies are 
equally objectified and commodified under the remnants of the late capitalist system 
that is still in place on Earth. Human and animal bodies are both, in the capitalist 
system, commodified through their labor power. Labor power is defined by Mary 
Murray as the commodity that is "the energetic and creative capacity" that workers 
produce (89).  
Marx identified the commodity labor power as the source of profit in the 
capitalist economy. The commodity labor power is able to produce more than 
its own value, or costs of subsistence. The value of labor power (wages) and 
the commodity value of non-human animals is determined like any other 
commodity in capitalist society, by the labor time socially necessary for its 
production – i.e. cost of food and shelter to enable subsistence and 
reproduction. (Murray 98) 
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Late capitalism, Murray argues, relies on non-human animal labor and animals as 
"walking larders" that produce commodities like "food, clothing, raw materials and 
medicines as well as forms of entertainment for humans" (97). In other words, in 
addition to their labor power as "beasts of burden, herders of sheep and cattle, 
wartime cannon fodder," and "security workers", the very bodies of non-human 
animals are commodities (Murray 97-98). On Earth, where humans are subjected to 
robotic work under degrading conditions, animals are seen as things. In response to 
Swan's praise of animals as kin, a pub patron replies: "They can pull my plow" 
(416). The humans, struggling under an oppressive system that commodifies their 
labor power, are unable and unwilling to accept the animals as beings that have 
worth beyond their commodity value. To them, animals are tools, and producers of 
surplus value through the commodification of their labor and bodies. This 
commodification and objectification of animals leads to humans experiencing "social 
relations between individuals" as "material relationships between things" (Murray 
100). 
While Murray calls these objectified and exploited animals slaves, Donna J. 
Haraway argues that another framework for examining the labor of animals is 
needed (55-56). Haraway specifically discusses the labor of working dogs, framing 
them as beings valued "as biotechnologies, workers, and agents of technoscientific 
knowledge production in the regime of lively capital" (56). Haraway theorizes that 
the Marxist analysis of animal labor and animals as consumers of commodities 
requires a framework that includes the examination of "use value, exchange value, 
and encounter value" (46). Trans-species encounter value, Haraway writes, "is about 
relationships among a motley array of lively beings, in which commerce and 
consciousness, evolution and bioengineering, and ethics and utilities are all in play" 
(ibid.).  
Haraway uses the term companion species to refer to working animals and 
their relationship to humans. Companion species are defined by Haraway as all those 
species that together constitute themselves through the relationships between them. 
Companion species, for Haraway, include all lifeforms from the microbial to the 
mammal. In 2312, Swan sees humans as a companion species to all life, and thus 
humans as one species of animal among others. Wolves emerge in 2312 as a species 
that is held in high regard by Swan: 
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She had howled with them more times than she could have counted; every 
time she heard them howl she joined in, feeling it was the human thing to do. 
She had seen wolves in discourse with coyotes, seen ravens lead them to a 
target kill for a share of their leavings. She knew that humans had made 
wolves more human, and thus dogs, and in that same period wolves had made 
humans more wolfish, by teaching them pack behaviors. … The two species 
had at different times scavenged each other's food; they had learned each 
other's hunting methods; they had, in short, coevolved. (397) 
Here, Swan's description of the relationship between human and wolf communities 
echoes Haraway's vision of companion species as a "becoming with". Becoming 
with can also be framed as the formation of complex relationships between beings 
that in themselves, outside of their relationships, are "never fully bounded" entities 
to begin with (Haraway 32). For Swan, wolves are an integral part of human 
evolution, and the two species are deeply entangled. For humans to continue as a 
species, wolves, and other entangled species, must then be seen not as things with 
commodity value, but as partners in a vast network of relationships that together 
constitute humans and other animals. Two distinct ways of viewing animals can thus 
be defined in 2312: the animal as a distinct class of beings that are part of the labor 
force and commodities markets, and the non-human animal as an equal partner to 
human animals.  
The reintroduction of a variety of animals on Earth is an attempt to foment a 
revolution in human-animal, and ultimately, human relationships. The appearance of 
animals on Earth causes Earth-dwelling humans to begin reasserting themselves as 
actors with influence on their own surroundings: "Fields changed, forests changed, 
suburbs and cities changed. Eradication campaigns were met with fierce resistance 
and fierce support efforts. Sometimes it came to a kind of war of the animals, but 
people always led the charge on both sides" (409). The boundaries of humans as 
animal beings are redrawn, as humans begin to engage with other animals as actors 
with agency.  
Robinson thus suggests that the view of animals as things and raw material 
stands in the way of real political change and progress. The position of animals in 
capitalism in turn affects the position of humans in the commodity market: humans 
can extract surplus value from the labor and bodies of animals, but this inequality of 
power at the same time masks the human laborer's own position as an exploited 
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resource. The creation of a parallel, new network of animal relationships challenges 
the stagnant status quo, awakening the humans' ability to affect change in their 
environment and political system.  
In addition to the relationships between animals and humans, Robinson also 
explores the relationships between humans and artificial life. Robinson introduces 
two different artificial lifeforms in 2312: a humanoid android and an implanted qube 
computer. In the next section, I discuss the emergence of these lifeforms, and their 
relation to animal life. 
 
3.2 Non-animal life 
 
Artificial life emerges in 2312 in two different forms: in Pauline, the 
quantum computer implanted behind Swan's ear, and in human-like androids that are 
built on Venus to act as the covert enactors of interplanetary terror plots. Pauline is 
an art project that develops a consciousness through gradual code improvements and 
frequent conversations with Swan, Pauline's coder-parent and host. The Venusian 
androids have developed consciousness through an unknown series of events. Some 
androids are set free by an unknown insider at the assembly facility after they realize 
a few of the androids have achieved consciousness. The Venusians are trying to 
destroy all released androids, and as a result, the android sees all humans as potential 
threats.  
Both Pauline and the androids are language-based lifeforms that have sprung 
forth from code. While there are no passages explicitly focalized through Pauline, 
three passages titled "Quantum Walk" are focalized through an escaped android. The 
passages reveal a mind that is both familiar and alien. It is familiar because of the 
shared system of language, specifically English; it is alien because of the android's 
superhuman ability to perceive and process inputs from its environment. Language is 
however only one aspect of communication and understanding. Cary Wolfe claims 
that semivoluntary kinesics, or paralinguistic gestures and unconscious nonverbal 
communication, forms a large part of human interpersonal communication (Animal 
86). Wolfe argues that this paralinguistic component of communication is a 
commonality between animals and humans. This is, in essence, another formulation 
of embodied communication as defined by Donna J. Haraway.  
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The involuntariness of some of this communication is a part of "a larger 
repertoire and history of signification not specifically human and yet intimately so" 
(Wolfe, Animal 87). While the processing power of the android's quantum computer 
brain is far superior to that of the human brain, the android is still a verbal language-
based lifeform.  As a language-based lifeform, the android lacks the ability to 
communicate nonverbally, and must learn it through practice. This is because 
nonverbal communication is a form of knowledge that cannot be fully expressed 
through verbal language, but instead must be learned through observing others, 
decoding their embodied messages, and then engaging in communicative gestures 
with other beings.  
For the android, human beings are alien others, incomprehensible and 
unpredictable because communication involves much more than words. Because of 
this, the android seems to find humans profoundly alien, as demonstrated below:  
don't meet people's eyes unless intending to speak     don't mention 
chess     for random sequences anything goes     because all strategies do 
equally poorly     thirty qubits strong     think fast . . .   
humans talking to other humans     perpetually they pass the Turing test     it 
isn't very hard      ask a question     seem distracted     data-poor environments 
inside them     or so it would seem by how they speak     they need a better 
test (295-296, formatting original)   
As mentioned earlier, embodied communication is not innate, but social. It is a skill 
humans and other animals learn over time. The android is, in its lack of social 
ability, then, comparable to a child, or a traveler in a foreign land. Wolfe quotes 
Wittgenstein: "… one human being can be a complete enigma to another. We learn 
this when we come into a strange country with entirely strange traditions; and, what 
is more, even given a mastery of the country's language. We do not understand the 
people" (Animal 44). The android's lack of social grace is not, then, necessarily proof 
of its profound difference from humans, but rather a result of unfamiliarity with 
human culture.  
The three "Quantum Walk" passages in 2312 show a gradual change in the 
android's voice as ze begins to learn about human habits.3 The first passage consists 
of short staccato phrases describing the information the android is taking in. The 
                                                
3 I use ze/hir as a gender neutral singular pronoun when referring to the android.  
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style is meant to evoke rapid observation and calculation. Snippets of encyclopedic 
information follow more lyrical phrases, making it difficult to decipher whether most 
of the flow indicates thought processes or a process of information channel surfing. 
The second passage incorporates phrases that indicate a sense of embodiment: "1.0 g 
feels like a pull from below    an entanglement with earth    rising up toward you    
even though you know you are descending" (438). Ze is beginning to express a 
dissonance between language-based knowledge and embodied experiences.  
There is also judgement of human faculties of perception: "sensory 
perceptions are already abstractions   humans see what they expect to see   they leap 
before they have time to look" (439). Then, however, the android considers hir own 
interpretation that humans fail to see things because of their preexisting expectations, 
asking hirself whether humans do in fact see like ze does. Cary Wolfe points out that 
"what we think of as 'normal' human visuality does not see – and it does not see that 
it does not see" (Posthumanism 131, emphasis original). This inattentional blindness, 
just as the android assumes, is the result of mental processes that filter human 
sensory data that the subconscious mind considers irrelevant (Wolfe, Posthumanism 
132). There is a difference, then, between the human and the android in the 
processing of sensory information: the human makes subconscious decisions on 
what sensory information matters, and the android processes all the sensory 
information it receives. The android, then is lacking in expectation: there is no 
anticipation and instinct, only perception and judgement. This difference, a lack of 
subconscious pre-cognitive processes, or forethought, differentiates the android from 
the animal. 
In the third "Quantum Walk" passage, the android begins to form more 
meaningful contacts with humans as ze meets Swan, who helps hir escape from the 
people trying to destroy hir. On a ferry on the way to freedom, ze looks at the 
humans around hir: "all the faces dense with life   eyes looking inward to other times 
past or future   or watching the day   like you" (534). Finally, Swan kisses the 
android goodbye, and there is an experience of connection: "the human kisses you on 
the mouth   click of eyeteeth jolts you both   suddenly awake to the reality of the 
other" (534). The physical and social act of an intimate touch invites the one to 
regard the other, and to relate to the other differently. The android, here, is shown to 
be human-like: capable of unpredictable action, susceptible to manipulation, and 
coming to terms with complicated embodiment.  
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Pauline, Swan's implanted quantum computer, represents a less individuated 
case of artificial life than the android discussed above. Pauline becomes sentient as 
the novel progresses while never having a separate body of her own. With Pauline, 
there is no clear boundary that is crossed between non-life and life, and Robinson 
does not reveal Pauline's internal world. However, Pauline speaks, and she speaks 
before she is considered to be alive. Are there, then, differences in the lives of the 
android and Pauline? Self-determination, privacy, and mobility are often features 
that have significance in how much humanity a human person is allowed in society. 
Since Pauline cannot leave her host, she has no privacy from Swan. Thus, she is a 
different kind of lifeform: a symbiont, a parasite, or perhaps a conjoined twin. These 
images invoke monstrosity and loss of bodily integrity through their associations 
with disease, contagion and physical deformity. The trope of body invasion by alien 
beings is a familiar one in science fiction, and invokes deep fears of loss of bodily 
control and madness.  
These negative connotations are however absent in Pauline. Pauline has 
certain similarities to virtual assistants like Apple's Siri or Amazon's Alexa: she is a 
piece of friendly technology that responds in a human-like way, retrieves 
information when asked to, and performs other tasks. This is the friendly face of 
artificial intelligence: the helper that is contained in a controllable device. Swan's 
control over Pauline is however illusory. For example, Pauline is able to record 
sensory information even when she is turned off. This suggests Pauline has control 
over her own functions, and Swan is merely a host body.  Although the relationship 
between Swan and Pauline is close and caring, even nurturing, Pauline's motives are 
not revealed. Whether Pauline acts from a sense of self-preservation or a sense of 
kinship, remains unclear. In fact, whether Pauline has emotions at all, or whether she 
can suffer, is not discussed in the novel.  
The role of human language in the emergence of consciousness is heavily 
centered on the appearance of the androids, and also Pauline's personhood. Self-
reflection and language games stand out as the defining features in both the androids 
and Pauline that differentiate them from computers or machines. Consciousness is, 
thus, defined from a distinctly human point of view: only those with the physically 
manifesting potential for human language and speech can be seen as consciously 
alive. Given this, human language becomes the prerequisite for conscious life in 
2312. Still, language and knowledge based on language are simultaneously shown 
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not to be a singularly human ability. Furthermore, intelligences much better at 
language games and analyzing information than any human being, embodied or 
otherwise, may emerge. These intelligences contest that humanity is the pinnacle of 
evolution, and challenge humanist hierarchies of exclusion. Such intelligences 
challenge the human position in the world, pushing humans closer to the animal 
world in the face of the non-animal other. Again, questions of embodiment and its 
boundaries arise.  
Furthermore, in the non-animal lifeforms, Robinson creates a space for a life 
that is not entirely defined by its proximity to qualities that are deemed essentially 
human. Pauline and the android, as non-animal, non-human lifeforms, have intellect, 
but potentially no physical capacity to suffer. This raises questions about the 
legitimacy of the principles behind granting nonhumans rights based on their 
physical similarities to humans. The android is shown to have at least some 
emotional capability, and thus the capacity to suffer psychologically. If granting 
rights to nonhumans is based mainly on the capacity for suffering, then Pauline has 
no rights, and the android should be granted some. In the novel, however, Pauline's 
life is neither officially recognized by society, nor acknowledged, while all 
humanoid androids are sentenced to exile or death.  
Recognition from those in power, writes Donna McCormack, is not 
necessarily always beneficial to those marked by difference from the normative 
human. McCormack quotes Kelly Oliver: "recognition itself is part of the pathology 
of oppression and domination" (163). The assimilation of difference into "an ever-
expanding category if humanity" still adheres to the hierarchy that measures all life 
in relation to the human (McCormack 163). Recognition also creates a hierarchy of 
difference. For example, in 2312, the androids are divided into those who are 
dangerous, and those who can be controlled: "We don't just turn them off and break 
them up, as some are calling for, but send the dangerous ones off in exile, just like 
we send off humans. That's got to be a good message to the qubes left behind. We'll 
keep them in boxes so we can keep them in our control" (527). The only non-animal 
life that humanity will tolerate, then, is that which humans can control. This 
simultaneously upholds the boundaries of humanity, recognizes the difference of the 
new lifeform, and sets limits for the tolerance afforded to the lifeform.  
The ambiguous status of Pauline is thus another opening for a new 
relationship and discussion. As McCormack writes: "[Unassimilable difference] 
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invites a reflection on a politics that is not based on exceptionality, where 
exceptionality refers both to the creation of laws for those deemed outside existing 
human laws and that which is purportedly unique about the human" (164). The lack 
of official recognition on Pauline's part leaves her outside the framework of laws and 
the enforcement of the boundaries of humanity, thus allowing for a new kind of a 
relationship to difference.  
 
3.3 Concluding remarks 
 
In both his depictions of animal and non-animal life, Robinson traces two 
separate frameworks of relating to difference. In both cases, human communities 
represent a view that centers human exceptionalism in relation to its others, 
privileging features in others that are seen as essentially human. Swan's view of 
nonhuman others comes to represent a posthumanist way of viewing both humanity 
and its companion species. In the case of animal life, Earth society views animals 
mainly as commodities and exploitable resources. Their preservation is important 
from the standpoint of biodiversity, but only because the continued existence of a 
habitable Earth is essential to human survival. Swan sees animals differently: as 
integral to human life. She sees human survival as dependent on a lively network of 
relationships among companion species. In the case of artificial life, the human 
community sees the humanoid androids as an existential threat that must be excised 
from society. Swan, in turn, sees them much like animals: as co-evolving 
companions.  
Swan's character functions as an intermediary between the characters whose 
humanity is implicitly accepted, and those whose personhood and consciousness is 
either questioned or outright rejected in the society of 2312. Swan's continued 
questioning of her own humanity, and the foregrounding of the constructedness of 
her body allow for a gradual shift in how other lifeforms are represented in the 
novel. As Swan's hybridity is revealed and explored in 2312, the arbitrary nature of 
the categories of human, animal and non-life become more articulated. If Swan is all 
of these things – human, animal and cybernetic – where do the boundaries lie? The 
novel does not provide an answer for this question outright but instead provides the 
reader with a complex character to articulate these questions.  
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By showing the contrast between the two approaches to difference, Robinson 
reveals the destructiveness of human exceptionalism. By focusing on human survival 
above that of all others, humanity has created the perfect conditions for its own 
extinction, and stifled human evolution. Furthermore, such a focus on human 
exceptionalism, new, emerging lifeforms are judged not based on their status as 
beings deserving of life, but as potential threats. Robinson thus suggests a change is 
in order. We must at least adjust, if not revolutionize our thinking about companion 
species, be they of animal or non-animal origin. In the next chapter, I examine the 
ways Robinson frames possible ways to change these relationships on the global 
scale. 
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4 Bodies in Space 
 
In this chapter, I discuss the movement of bodies in space,4 and the ways this 
affects the relationships between humans and nonhuman animals. I maintain that 
Robinson creates a world in which nature is an expression of human bodily 
practices, and thus also incorporates technology and constructed environments. I 
further argue that combined with this definition of nature, the reanimation effort 
carried out by Swan and other spacers extends the space of wilderness to encompass 
the Earth as a whole. Robinson suggests that sustainability as an approach to the 
preservation of animal species is an insufficient framework, and thus a radical shift 
in how humans perceive the space of wildness is needed to combat environmental 
degradation. 
In the first part of the chapter, I study the movement of human bodies in 
space, and the different ways Nigel Thrift's concept of stance comes into play in the 
novel in relation to the experience of nature. This discussion aims to show that 
nature is not a feature of specific environments, but rather product of the orientation 
of bodies, and bodily practices in space. In the second part of this chapter, I discuss 
the space of wilderness as it relates to humans and non-human animals. My view is 
that preservation efforts and wildlife management reduce the animals to 
representations of their genetic material, and position wilderness as a specific, 
bounded final location for animal populations. Robinson seems to suggest in 2312 
that wilderness must be expanded to encompass human habitats for real change in 
human-animal relationships to occur. 
 
4.1 Movement, stance, and nature 
 
Before I discuss the movement and orientation of bodies in space, I will 
specify what I mean by the term space. Nigel Thrift characterizes space as "a 
practical set of configurations that mix in a variety of assemblages thereby producing 
new senses of space" (16). In other words, space is an amalgamation of different 
phenomena, both individually embodied, and distributed among different 
                                                
4 For clarity, I will use the term space in this chapter to refer to the space in which bodies and other 
entities move, and the term interplanetary space to refer the solar system and the deep space beyond. 
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actors.5  The "practical set of configurations", according to Thrift, is the combination 
of the observer and the sense of space created by the observer's perception of space. 
Space thus emerges as a distributed system of spatial relations, not anchored in any 
particular place. Assemblages, in turn, encompass different kinds of organisms, 
networks, geographical phenomena, and the ties between them. The term leaves 
open the question of the boundary: bodies can for example interface and merge with 
technology, thus changing the sense of space, or the dimensions of a body. In other 
words, bodies as assemblages produce space through their relations with other 
phenomena, and produce their own boundaries in the process. 
Thrift also introduces the concept of stance. Stance is a term to describe the 
ways in which precognitive processes or forethought, perception, and prior intent 
combine to produce a "fleeting sensory forecast" to enable conscious thought (Thrift 
61). Forethought, according to Thrift, is the subconscious preprocessing of sensory 
information, and automated bodily processes that take place before a conscious 
decision to act is made. In other words, stance is an amalgamation of embodied 
cultural and bodily practices, automated skills, non-cognitive processing of sensory 
inputs, and the automated use of forethought. The processes that together make up 
stance form a significant part of what is considered consciousness, yet are not 
experienced as conscious decisions. 
Let me now explore how the concept of stance emerges in 2312. Throughout 
the novel, Swan and Wahram travel to new locations. Their stance to the world 
changes depending on their familiarity and expectations of the spaces they move 
through. I will examine two different passages in the novel where characters exhibit 
different stances to the world: Swan on Earth, and the Mercurial practice of 
sunwalking. My claim is that these passages show how Robinson creates a sense of 
nature that is independent of the qualities of the physical environment, and thus a 
product of the actor's stance. 
After leaving her home, the city of Terminator on Mercury, she visits Io, and 
then travels to Earth to meet her former partner Zasha. The voyage down to Earth is 
accomplished through a five-day stay in a hotel-like space elevator shipping people, 
food and raw materials from interplanetary space to Earth. When Swan reaches the 
                                                
5 The term actor here refers to any node in a network as put forth in Bruno Latour's actor-network 
theory. Actor can refer to any idea, process, force, human or nonhuman that affects the phenomenon 
that is being studied. 
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surface, Robinson inundates the narrative with details of sensory phenomena. The 
sea is a mass of glossy, vibrant color, and the vast sky fills Swan's senses so that the 
air itself seems to have agency.  
[The Terran sky] looked like a blue dome flattened at the center, perhaps a 
few kilometers above the clouds – she reached up for it – although knowing 
too that it was just a kind of rainbow made it glorious. A rainbow that was 
blue everywhere and covered everything. The blue itself was complex, 
narrow in range but infinite within that range. It was an intoxicating sight, 
and you could breathe it – one was always breathing it, you had to. The wind 
shoved it into you! Breathe and get drunk, oh my, to be free of all restraint, 
minimally clothed, lying on the bare surface of a planet, sucking in its 
atmosphere as if it were an aqua vitae, feeling in your chest how it kept you 
alive! (91) 
For a brief moment Swan's stance toward the world is in flux as she is thrust in a 
faintly familiar, yet partially forgotten world of bodily perception. She however 
quickly regains her intuition about her environment, and the narrative returns to a 
more subdued, visually based mode of describing what Swan sees around her. She 
does not have to think about the minutiae of moving and traveling on Earth; the pre-
cognitive processes take over and allow her the capacity to consciously observe 
architecture and people while in transit: "She collected herself and walked over to 
the dock. A big grumbling water ferry took her any many others and after 
negotiating a crowded canal, they were out on the Hudson River and going down to 
Manhattan" (91-92).  
In Manhattan, she takes in the diversity of the human faces around her, and 
perceives the ambient sounds and the reflections on the windows of tall buildings. 
She rejoices in the openness of the space:  
Below her the slop of water threw up a big ambient sound. Human voices, 
and water splashing, and the cries of gulls back on the docks, and the rush of 
wind through the canyons of buildings; these were the sounds of the city. … 
Behind her, down the avenue to the west, mirrorflakes of broken light 
bounced on the big river. This was the thing she loved – she was outdoors, 
truly in the open. (93)  
Here, Swan orients herself in New York like a tourist in a new place: the 
environment is familiar in that it is full of human construction and humans 
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themselves. She is outdoors, and affected by the vastness of the sky, yet she is still in 
a city, navigating the grid map of the urban environment.  
Later, in New Jersey, she ventures out by herself:  
She walked on the dirt by the side of the road and looked at the marsh and the 
sky. On the other side of the road some old buildings were nestled under a 
stand of trees. Rows of old apartment blocks beyond. Croak of frog. She sat 
on the edge of the marsh and saw the black dots half in and half out of the 
water under her. (101) 
In this passage, a different stance emerges. The narrative gives a sense of slower 
movement, and of less ambient noise. Swan looks at the landscape differently: she 
looks at her surroundings as groupings of objects whereas in the city environment 
the focus is on fleeting perceptions. In Manhattan, the place she orients herself in is 
the urban environment in general, whereas in New Jersey, she is located in the 
smaller, more specific place she can directly perceive around her. The environments 
themselves are not radically different: both are by water, both have buildings, paved 
walkways, and ambient animal sounds. Experiencing one as nature and one as 
something else is not, then strictly based on the individual elements present in the 
perceived environment, but rather a matter of stance.  
Thrift further argues that certain kinds of bodily practices produce "particular 
experiences of what nature is" (67).  Thrift writes: 
The body attends to configurations of objects which are in line with its 
expectations and which produce particular exfoliations/spaces and times. The 
body produces spaces and times through the things of nature which, in turn, 
inhabit the body through that production. (68) 
In this formulation, trees, for example, become part of the assemblage of which the 
body is a part. This assemblage is created in the relationships of the different 
components to each other, be it bodies in movement, trees, animals or buildings. 
Nature, then, is a meaning produced through the process of assemblage and not a 
feature than can be found in a landscape or certain types of flora or fauna. This 
understanding of nature can be found in 2312 in sunwalking. 
Sunwalking is a Mercurial practice of walking westward on the surface of the 
planet ahead of the dawn: 
Many have made this a way of life. They walk roughly westward, staying 
always ahead of the stupendous day. … [M)any of them pause in their 
 37 
walkabouts on certain cliffs and crater rims, at places marked by stupas, 
cairns, petroglyphs, inuksuit, mirrors, walls, goldsworthies.6 The sunwalkers 
stand by these, facing east, waiting. (1) 
Here, the landscape of Mercury, devoid of any indigenous life, is nevertheless 
inscribed with human meaning associated with material resources, natural 
formations, spiritual practice, and art. Mercury's surface formations have been 
named and have thus become specific focal points in the landscape. Katrin A. Lund 
traces the organizing of the landscape into recognizable features to the increase in 
tourism in eighteenth century England: " 
This new appreciation of the wilderness was accompanied by an aesthetic 
evaluation; the traveller needed to know how to look and how to connect 
forms, features and colours to perceive the wilderness landscape as God’s 
work of art. … Chaotic nature needed to be adopted into scenery" (162).  
Through the naming and singling out of specific locations as landmarks, Mercury's 
surface is marked as nature, and created as a place that can be visited. Works of 
environmental art, constructed from indigenous elements, draw the visitor's attention 
to the materiality of the surroundings. These works of art also act as boundary 
markers between society and wilderness: they are gathering places where sunwalkers 
gather to observe and experience nature.  
Other ways of nature production also exist on Mercury. Some sunwalkers 
"farm" Mercury's rocks with the aid of metallophytes, transforming the landscape 
from a barren rockface into a site or production: "Some of them hurry from location 
to location, pausing to look in cracks they earlier inoculated with bioleaching 
metallophytes, quickly scraping free any accumulated residues of gold or tungsten or 
uranium" (1). That this farming produces metals instead of food is irrelevant in the 
context of viewing nature as a resource. Through the human activity of farming, 
nature is both created and cultured through framing the landscape as a transformable 
natural resource.  
In addition to farming the rock for metals, the sunwalkers stay and watch the 
first rays of dawn through the faceplates of their suit helmets. They stay until the last 
safe moment before returning to safety in order to see more of the star. 
                                                
6 Goldsworthy is a neologism Robinson uses throughout the novel to refer to works of art created on 
site with site-specific materials. The term is a reference to sculptor Andy Goldsworthy. 
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 [O]ne last look at sunrise on Mercury. In the ultraviolet it's a perpetual blue 
snarl of hot and hotter. With the disk of the photosphere blacked out, the 
fantastic dance of the corona becomes clearer, all the magnetized arcs and 
short circuits, the masses of burning hydrogen pitched out at the night. 
Alternatively you can block the corona … and even magnify your view of it, 
until the burning tops of the convection cells are revealed in their squiggling 
thousands, each a thunderhead of fire burning furiously … All these long 
spicules of flame dance in circular patterns around the little black circles that 
are the sunspots – shifting whirlpools in the storms of burning. Masses of 
spicules flow together like kelp beds threshed by a tide. (2-3) 
Here, the sunwalkers gather at specific viewing locations to experience the 
overwhelming visions of the sun. The description of the sun and its overwhelming 
power also evokes the sublime. Lund quotes Emily Brady's definition of the sublime 
as "an aesthetic moment in which we come to some greater awareness of our 
relationship to the natural world and our inability to control its astonishing qualities" 
(167). The sun, three times closer to Mercury than Earth, holds the power to destroy 
those who are mesmerized by it:  
You may think you are inured, that nothing outside the mind can really 
interest you anymore, as sophisticated and knowledgeable as you are. But 
you would be wrong. You are a creature of the sun. The beauty and terror of 
it seen from so close can empty any mind, thrust anyone into a trance. It's 
like seeing the face of God, some people say, and it is true the sun powers all 
living creatures in the solar system, and in that sense is our god. The sight of 
it can strike thought clean out of your head. People seek it out precisely for 
that. (3-4, emphasis original) 
Sunwalking, then, in addition to being connected with a tourism-like consumption of 
what is seen as nature, is also a way to engage with the immensity of the cosmos.  
Mercury's dawn is perhaps comparable to visiting an active volcano, where 
the insides of the planet hiss and bubble at the visitor's feet. Experiences of this kind 
of nature are not regenerative, rather, they are a nihilistic and spiritual meeting of an 
uncontrollable force. Nature, experienced like this, makes a mockery of human ego. 
Nature in 2312 emerges as specific ways of interacting with places. On 
Mercury, nature is experienced though the power of the rising sun, and through the 
less spectacular ordering of the planet's surface into a place that can be visited. 
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Nature is thus a stance toward movement, and a stance toward relationships between 
assemblages located in space. Nature, therefore, is not an innate quality of any 
specific type of biome or environment, but comes into existence in the interaction 
and merging between actors and assemblages, and space. Hence, nature is also 
independent of life: the lifeless surface of Mercury and Io, and the rings of Saturn 
become nature, when the character's stance creates a locality of place, and endows it 
with the qualities of nature through bodily practices. Nature is also constituted 
through human activities such as mapping, tourism and farming, or, in other words, 
associating specific places with specific activities and values.  
Through these contrasts, Robinson shows the arbitrariness of designating 
only narrowly defined, specific types of places as nature, and opens up a discussion 
of nature on an interplanetary scale. If nature is not a based on the elements in an 
environment but the result of stance and human activity, nature can exist in any 
environment, including outer space. Robinson shows the stark beauty of the nature 
of other planets, suggesting that such environments and landscapes have value in 
themselves without massive human intervention. Humans, in their relentless desire 
to shape the landscape into a resource, are in danger of repeating some of the 
mistakes that have been made on Earth. In interplanetary space, the danger is not in 
the loss of biodiversity, but rather in the loss of difference and the sublime quality of 
cosmic landscapes. 
Nature, then, is a relationship articulated in space and time. Furthermore, 
nature does not preexist human activity but emerges as the other to society. In the 
second part of this chapter I examine the production of nature on Earth, and the 
concept of wilderness. I argue that wilderness, like nature, is constituted through 
spatial and interspecies relationships. In addition to examining wilderness, I argue 
that wildness, distinct from wilderness, emerges in 2312 as a potential in all 
environments. 
 
4.2 The space of wilderness and wildness 
 
The familiar dystopian vision of a nearly dead world consisting of humans, 
cockroaches, rats, and possibly pigeons, is invoked as a possible future for Earth in 
2312: "[M]uch of Earth was now occupied by the toughest weeds and scavengers. 
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There was talk of a coming world of seagulls and ants, cockroaches and crows, 
coyotes and rabbits – a star thistle world, depopulate and impoverished – a big 
broken factory farm" (410). These types of animals are seen as pests and vermin, but 
what separates them from many others is their ability to thrive in spaces with human-
constructed boundaries. They are wild animals who go where they please, and their 
nature is highly urban. These animals are ones the humans continually negotiate 
space with: people will begrudgingly live alongside rats and pigeons when 
extermination efforts fail, and will generally avoid places with large communities of 
cockroaches. Humans will occasionally try to reclaim urban space from animals, but 
humans do not have complete access to the world of these animals. In short, the 
relationship between humans and such animals is different to that of humans and the 
kinds of animals generally considered wild: rats, pigeons and cockroaches share the 
space of humanity, and their coexistence is one of constant, often violent negotiation. 
The space relegated to the other kinds of wild animals is much smaller and 
more tightly regulated. David Lulka discusses the case of the wildlife management 
processes used in Yellowstone National Park in the Unites States. The purpose of the 
processes is to ensure two things: that the population of Yellowstone bison remains 
genetically diverse enough to survive, and that the herd remains within the 
boundaries of the national park. The bison, however, do not care about property 
laws, and from time to time enter private lands that border the national park. Lulka's 
example shows that the space afforded to wildlife is constrained both by invisible 
and tangible human boundaries: fences, property laws, roads, buildings. The attempt 
to stabilize the population and contain it within a tightly bounded area, Lulka argues, 
is at the core of modern wildlife management: "[O]ne of the primary goals [of 
wildlife management] is to impede movement and the change it may produce. To a 
substantial degree, success is judged by the ability to forge a final destination for 
nonhumans within the modern social environment" (454). Wildlife populations, then, 
are expected to remain where they are and as they are, that is, they are expected to 
remain the same population instead of becoming a population (Lulka 545). Wild 
animals, in other words, should be tied to a specific place where they can be 
managed. This place is their final destination: a place that is experienced as nature by 
humans, and that is designated as a primarily nonhuman environment. This place is 
the space of wilderness. 
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The animal repopulation effort Swan and Wahram participate in is an effort 
to deconstruct the notion of a stable, final destination for specific animal 
populations. The group of activists guide the migration of the caribou and the wolf 
pack that follows them through private lands, ignoring the human uses of the land: 
This leading of animal migrations across agricultural land was the biggest 
organized act of civil disobedience ever committed by spacers on Earth, but 
the hope was that after being escorted the first time, the animals would 
manage on their own, and become popular with the indigenous humans, even 
the farmers, who were not having much success anyway. (399) 
The intent of the spacers is, then, not the establishment of specific, local populations, 
but rather an entire ecosystem of moving and changing populations. The key aspect 
of the rewilding effort is the free movement of self-organizing and self-sustaining 
populations of animals across, and beyond, human-defined borders.  
Without free movement through space, Lulka argues, animal populations lose 
agency, and become mere representations of their preserved "primordial DNA" 
(454). Populations of wild animals are confined to their final destinations with no 
promise of the expansion of their domain (ibid.). In 2312, the expansion of 
wilderness is indeed a motivation and the end goal for the preservation of different 
species, but there is no political will to designate any land as future wilderness. Swan 
and Wahram are involved in multiple development efforts around the globe, but 
nearly everywhere they face fierce obstruction. The people themselves seem held 
down by the rigid economic system and the weight of human customs:  
On the God-damned Earth the accumulated traditions and laws and habits 
made something that was worse than any body bra; it was one's mind that 
was held in place, tied in straitjackets, obliged to be like all the others in their 
ridiculous boxed habits. Here they were, on the only planetary surface on 
which you could walk freely, naked to the wind and the sun, and when they 
had a choice, they sat in boxes and stared at little boxes, just as if they had no 
choice – as if they were in a space station – as if the bad old days of the 
caged centuries had never gone away. They didn't even look up at the stars at 
night. (387) 
Humans remain apathetic and hostile to change until they are involved in the 
restoration efforts of their own environments. Wahram tells Swan of a coastal 
restoration effort where local people have become invested in bettering their 
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environment: "The ocean rips up what it inundates, and a lot of toxic stuff gets 
released. The new shoreline and tidal zone is usually a disaster. Fixing all that is very 
labor intensive. And yet everyone living on the new coasts wants to see it done. 
Many want to do it themselves" (392). The creation of new commons can happen, 
but the release of privately owned land remains impossible. The needs of capital 
override the needs of the planet and its animal populations.  
Free movement without respect to property law is at the core of animal life. 
Lulka, referencing Deleuze, argues that movement through space is what the 
existence of animal life requires. The herd of animals is a process rather than a 
population, expressing itself through iteration, and affecting its surroundings as it 
migrates. In other words, Nomadic movements populations transform space, and the 
population itself, making and remaking itself through its movement. Movement, in 
Lulka's view, is what constitutes animal agency. In 2312, the newly rehomed animal 
populations are primed for migration, and with a little human help, immediately 
begin the transformation of the land and themselves as a population: 
This new herd's migration would be instinctive but aimless – unless they 
picked up old traces of the lost Beverly, Bathurst, and Ahiak herds – so, 
whichever way they took now would begin to establish the smells and other 
signs of a new migration route. This would then become a de facto habitat 
corridor through the new wheat zone, a corridor that would perhaps need to 
be defended in the relevant courts, but they could cross that bridge when 
came to it; first the caribou had to cross the river. (398-399) 
Here, the new relationships between nature, wilderness and wildness begin to 
emerge. Wilderness begins to intrude onto property, with caribou and the pursuant 
wolves crushing grain fields. Wildness expands into suburban areas in the shape of 
deer and other animals. As a result, the boundaries between nature and society must 
be renegotiated. Animals are no longer the targets of repressive management, but 
agents in a new, dynamic configuration of space and wilderness. Lulka suggests as 
much: 
 [T]he official definition of wildness skirts around the realization that 
wildness is fundamentally relational, continually in contact with externalities, 
and thus, in the process of delineating the place of wildness (figured as 
wilderness), there is unavoidably a devaluation of the expressive qualities of 
nonhumans and the spatial relations they entail. (Lulka 458) 
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As a result of the reanimation of Earth, wildness itself becomes redefined: As 
the space of wilderness expands to cover the entirety of Earth, wildness becomes a 
potential in all environments, no longer confined inside the borders of wildlife 
preserves and terraria. Encounters with wildness, in turn, force humanity to face the 
animals in a new way. Animals become actors and present individuals instead of 
representations of preserved genetic pools: "After the reanimation, problems on 
Earth became ecological and logistical and focused on transport, dispersion, 
mitigation, compensation, and legal and physical defense" (410). The sharing of 
space with wild animals, then, changes human space through a rebuilding of 
relationships.  
The reanimation effort is a success, although its effects are not truly 
understood until decades after the event as the animal populations gradually expand 
their habitats and shape the land: "[T]he so-called invisible revolutions on Earth led 
to the recreation of its landscapes both physical and political, all of which followed 
the Reanimation" (552). Much like the animals remake the Earth, humans remake 
themselves iteratively, generation by generation, in encounters with wildness. 
Robinson thus seems to suggest that any true revitalization of Earth, or the 
prevention of further loss of animal life, must include a sharing of "valued land and 
resources with nonhumans who dare to contest existing property regimes" (Lulka 
455).  
The remaking of the world, like any major political upheaval, is not an easy 
process: 
And all the events continued to occur against the most intense resistance of 
time, material, and human recalcitrance – human fear, in fact, seizing with a 
desperate grip various imagined props out of the past that were somehow felt 
to hold the world together. Because of this, there was and always is the risk 
of utter failure and mad gibbering extinction. There is no alternative to 
continuing struggle. (553) 
Humans, then, are pushed to let go of their comfortable habits and ways of relating 
to the world and others. What is being destroyed in the process is the privileged 
position of humanity on Earth: animals, now an undeniable force and presence, may 
attack and kill humans, and property will be destroyed. Life, iterating itself over and 
over through matter, respects no human law. 
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4.3 Concluding remarks 
 
In presenting Mercury's barren surface as a location for sublime experiences 
of cosmic nature, Robinson expands what we see as nature. Through making the 
live-giving and destructive power of the sun the center of these experiences, he 
invites the reader to consider nature as something larger than the remaining spaces of 
wilderness. Nature does not reside in national parks, Robinson suggests, but rather in 
our stance toward the world. Wilderness, in turn, is a poor replacement for wildness. 
Wilderness areas serve to contain and bind wildlife in its place, and this containment 
allows all the remaining land to become property. Robinson suggests this system of 
owning the land must go for the Earth to survive as a lively planet.  
Furthermore, Robinson acknowledges that fundamental changes in how we 
see the world and make ourselves in it are not painless. Such change involves 
struggle, fear, and suffering. Change is however necessary if life is to endure in the 
solar system, and change is less painful than assured destruction through stagnation.  
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5 Conclusion 
 
In this thesis, I have sought to prove three arguments. In the second chapter, I 
argued that the human body in 2312 is shown to be two things: an imagined, 
normative body with culturally defined and enforced borders, and an open system 
that accepts connections and fusions. The imagined, normative body is constantly 
challenged by living bodies that refuse to conform to the definitions of what a body 
is, or can do. Often even those who strive to maintain the borders of the normative 
body fail because of forbidden contacts or unruly limbs.  
In the third chapter, I argued that the differences between humans and other 
animals in the novel are differences of degree, not kind, and that these differences 
are, like the boundaries of the body, arbitrary and shifting. The exclusion of 
everything that is considered nonhuman generates hierarchies that dehumanize other 
humans, and relegate animals and non-animal others to the position of objects and 
tools.  
My argument for the final chapter was that nature in 2312 is not a quality of 
any specific environment, but a process of orienting the body in space. I further 
argued that movement through space is a key aspect of enabling new relationships 
between humans, animals, and wildness. These relationships constitute our world, 
and hold within them the potential to remake the world.  
In 2312, Robinson explores the fluidity and fragility of the boundaries of 
humanness, and the mechanisms which police these borders. The extraordinary 
things about humans end up being their ability to extend the human habitat beyond 
Earth, and adapt and evolve through technology. Robinson shows two ways of being 
human: the transcendent model of victory over embodiment, and the openness to 
others Swan portrays. Only openness allows for an understanding of being that 
decenters humans, and allows for an ethics not based on the traditions of humanist 
philosophy. Robinson's novel thus suggests that humanity can, and should, evolve to 
include others in its definition. The cosmos is shown as a vast network of life, all its 
members and components interlinked and dependent on each other. Through the 
acceptance of humanity as a plurality, from the earliest symbionts to future chimeras, 
humanity expands to include the myriad relationships that our bodies are inseparably 
entangled in. 
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Having chosen such a broad theoretical framework for my thesis, I have not 
been able to engage in much debate with the secondary material. In some cases, I 
have chosen to leave out criticism of the sources in order to focus on analyzing the 
novel itself. Questions of the self and embodiment, as well as intersectional issues 
regarding gender and race would have deserved their space in this thesis. Should I 
begin again from the start, I would perhaps narrow my topic in order to debate these 
issues further. 
Despite its shortcomings, this thesis shows the richness of science fiction as a 
topic of academic study. Works of science fiction create both impossible and 
occasionally plausible futures and other worlds that allow us to examine humanity 
and ethics in new ways. In creating these worlds, science fiction reveals the 
preoccupations of today's humans, and the hierarchies of exclusion and inclusion that 
are sometimes difficult to tease out. Spectacular alien natures and monstrous others 
foreground these hierarchies, and allow the study of human problems without the full 
weight of human history.  
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